Ciência Política: Introdução à Sófocles*1 -/- Science Politics: Introduction to Sophocles -/- Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva*2 -/- Sófocles (496/4-406 a.C.) -/- 1 CONTEXTO HISTÓRICO: TEATRO E POLÍTICA -/- Na Grécia antiga, o teatro fazia parte das celebrações religiosas, especialmente nos rituais e representações dos festivais em homenagem ao deus Dionísio. A tragédia nasceu de tais circunstâncias, culminando seu apogeu no século V a.C., com as peças de Ésquilo*3 (525-456a.C.), SÓFOCLES*4 (496/4-406 a.C.) e Eurípedes*5 (480-406 a.C.). Pode-se dizer que, contrário (...) ao que ocorre normalmente, a arte não se deixou preceder pela filosofia, pois os poetas eram filósofos, pensando com sua própria mente e constituindo-se na vanguarda intelectual do seu tempo. -/- SÓFOCLES, em 468 a.C., ganhou do já consagrado Ésquilo, seu primeiro prêmio de tragédia, quando tinha vinte e sete anos. Ele nasceu em Colono, nas imediações de Atenas, filho de fabricante de espadas, que, com as guerras da Pérsia e do Peloponeso, aumentou seus serviços consideravelmente, enriquecendo a família. Não obstante, os demais atenienses empobreceram miseravelmente. SÓFOCLES era considerado bonito, inclusive sua estátua, que o representa na velhice, indica-lhe como um vigoroso homem. Era muito habilidoso em tudo o que fazia, tanto nas tragédias, como nas guerras e nos esportes. -/- Foi contemporâneo e amigo de Péricles*6 (495-429 a.C.), grande líder de Atenas, que lhe 6 ajudou a ocupar altos cargos, como o de tesoureiro e general, em 443 a.C. Em 440 a.C., encontrava-se entre os generais e comandantes das forças atenienses contra Pomos. Foi, ainda, membro do Comitê de Segurança Pública, votando a favor da Constituição oligárquica, em 411 a.C. Exerceu, também, funções de sacerdote. Era um homem alegre e amante dos prazeres, emanando encanto e simpatia, que lhes faziam perdoar os erros, envolvido com rapazes e cortesãs, inclusive teve um filho da célebre hetera Têoris.*7 Foi também contemporâneo de Eurípedes, ainda que nascido bem antes deste, mas ambos morreram no mesmo ano, em 406 a.C. -/- SÓFOCLES escreveu cento e treze peças, das quais só nos chegaram sete, nesta ordem de procedência, Ajax (c. 445 a.C.) As Traquínias (c. 445 a.C.), Antígona (c. 442), Édipo Rei (c. 425), Electra (c. 415), Filoteuto (409) e Édipo em Colono (401). Ganhou o primeiro prêmio de teatro, por dezenove vezes, tendo vinte e sete anos na primeira, e oitenta e cinco, na última. Governou o teatro ateniense por mais de trinta anos, da mesma maneira que seu amigo Péricles governava Atenas. -/- Escreveu uma trilogia não intencional, com as tragédias Édipo Rei (425 a.C.), Édipo em Colono (401 a.C.) e Antígona (442 a.C.). A primeira foi o mais famoso dos dramas gregos, tendo uma abertura impressionante, com a população diante do palácio real de Tebas. Havia uma peste que assolava a cidade, e isso os oráculos identificaram como decorrência de um grande crime. A clássica narrativa tratava de um filho, Édipo, que inadvertidamente matara o pai, Laio, e se casara com a mãe, Jocasta, com a qual teve quatro filhos: Antígona, Polinice, Etéocles e Ismênia. Quando tudo fora descoberto, Jocasta se enforcara e Édipo, enlouquecido, arrancara os próprios olhos e abandonara Tebas, partindo para o exílio em companhia apenas de Antígona. Já em Édipo em Colonos, este estava envelhecido a mendigar em Colono, perto de Atenas, apoiado apenas pela filha. -/- Antígona foi a última peça da trilogia, ainda que tenha sido a primeira a ser escrita. Ao tomar conhecimento de que seus irmãos Polinice e Etéocles estavam em guerra pelo trono de Tebas, regressou apressada para tentar apaziguá-los. Não obstante, eles lutaram até a morte. Creonte aliado de Etéocles, tomou o reino e puniu a rebeldia de Polinice, proibindo que fosse sepultado. Antígona, evocando a crença de que o espírito de um morto só se livrava das torturas da morte depois do corpo ser enterrado, violou o decreto de Creonte e sepultou seu irmão Polinice. Houve, então, o conflito entre as leis dos homens com as leis dos deuses, optando ela por esta, como esperavam as pessoas dignas de se comportarem. Antígona foi condenada pelo tio a ser enterrada viva, colocada em uma catacumba. Seu noivo, Hêmam, filho de Creonte, que desaparecera quando ela desobedecera o decreto real, voltou e encontrou sua prometida morta, suicidando-se em seguida.*8 O drama era denso em todos os seus elementos, mas se elevava quando discutia o comportamento que o cidadão devia ter frente às leis opressivas. -/- 2 DESOBEDIÊNCIA CIVIL: RECUSA DE ANTÍGONA -/- Antígona e sua irmã Ismênia representavam, respectivamente, os símbolos de resistência à tirania e de obediência à razão, colocando a lei de Creonte frente à lei da justiça. Diante do édito que impedia Antígona de sepultar Polinice, considerava a existência do direito natural de enterrá-lo, sendo este o seu drama político. Devia obedecer às leis da polis ou da consciência e dos princípios religiosos? Este drama é representado pelo magnífico texto de SÓFOCLES, quando Creonte perguntou se Antígona tripudiava sobre suas leis. Antígona lhe respondeu que: -/- “Essas leis não foram promulgadas por Zeus, nem mesmo a Justiça, que convive com os deuses do inferno, foi a que estabeleceu tais princípios para os homens. Ele ainda afirmou que os anúncios das leis de Creonte não tinham o poder que eles imaginavam que o tinha, e que um simples mortal pudesse suplantar os preceitos, não escritos e imutáveis dos deuses. Antígona ainda afirma que tais preceitos não foram de hora, como também não fora de ontem, mas que sempre vigoraram no mundo sensível, e que ninguém sabia ao certo de sua existência. Antígona afronta Creonte dizendo que por causa das leis do mesmo, não queria ser ela castigada perante os deuses por ter, de alguma forma, medo da ira e afronta de um reles mortal. Ainda diz que sua morte é algo inevitável, uma vez que é a única certeza dos homens, e que ela há de vir em um tempo, pois isso não se pode ignorar, todavia se sua morte não a tivesse sido anunciada antes, e que com isso morrera antes do tempo, o tomaria como vantagem, uma vez que, submetido as mais variadas intempéries da vida, como não iria considerar sua morte um benefício? E com isso, essa dor de nada vale no tocante de seu destino. Antígona continua dizendo que em nada o afeta ao ver o cadáver do filho morto de sua mãe na condição de insepulto, uma vez que isso não lhe causa dor . O mesmo conclui dizendo que se achara que ele cometera um ato de loucura após a proclamação de sua resposta, talvez o achasse louco aquele que viera a condená-lo.”*9 -/- O conflito entre a lei positiva, enunciava o drama grego, e a lei natural, significava que esta identificava-se com a Justiça dos deuses, que era superior à lei da terra.*10 Para Antígona, aquela deveria sempre prevalecer, mas a sua morte representou o triunfo, mesmo que trágico, da lei da polis.*11 SÓFOCLES foi quem primeiro falou do direito de resistência, inclusive com a possibilidade de se sofrer uma grave sanção, como ocorreu com Antígona, e ainda assim sabendo suportar a dor.*12 A teoria não logrou desenvolvimento na Grécia antiga, nem na teoria política antiga. Deixou, porém, uma indagação que só no século XVIII começou a ser respondida, pela forma clássica do direito de resistência. -/- NOTAS: *1: In. COSTA, N. N. Ciência Política. 3. ed. Rio de Janeiro: Forense, 2012. p. 61-67. *2: Tecnólogo em agropecuária pelo Instituto Federal de Pernambuco campus Belo Jardim. Normalista pela Escola Frei Cassiano Comacchio. Pesquisador assíduo de assuntos de cunho filosófico, com ênfase em política. *3: “Ésquilo, poeta grego (Elêusis, c. 525 – Gela, Sicília, 456 a.C.). Suas obras, As Suplicantes (c. 490), Os Persas (472), Os Sete contra Tebas (467), Prometeu Acorrentado (depois de 467) e a trilogia da Oréstia(Agamênom, Os Coéforos, As Eumênides) (458), fazem dele o verdadeiro criador da tragédia grega” (KOOGAN/HOUAISS. Enciclopédia e Dicionário Ilustrado, op. cit., p. 622). *4: “Sofócles, o poeta trágico grego (Colono, perto de Atenas, entre 496 e 494 a.C., Atenas 406 a.C.). Amigo de Péricles e Heródoto, cidadão completo, obteve, durante sua carreira excepcional, mais de 20 vitórias em concursos dramáticos. De sua obra, apenas sete tragédias, entre as mais de uma centena, e um drama satírico, do qual só restam longos fragmentos, Os Cães de Caça, chegaram até nós: Ajax (c. 445 a.C.), Trachiniani (c. 445?), Antígona(442), Édipo rei (c. 425), Electra (c. 415), Filotecto (409), Édipo em Colono (401). Deu à tragédia sua configuração definitiva: elevando de 12 para 15 o número de integrantes do coro,acrescentou um terceiro ator e substituiu atrilogia unida pela trilogia livre, onde cada drama forma um todo. Em Sófocles, a ação da tragédia é levada a termo pela vontade e pelas paixões do herói, indivíduo excepcional que, em luta contra um destino que o oprime, continua livre” (Grande Enciclopédia Larousse Cultural, op. cit., vol. 22, p. 5.441). *5: “Eurípedes, poeta trágico grego (Salamina, 480 – Macedônia, 406,a.C.), cujas obras mais célebres são: Alcestes (438), Medeia (431), Hipólito (428), Andrômaca (c. 426), Hécuba (c. 424), Íon (c. 418), Ifigênia em Áulida, As Bacantes. Eurípedes introduziu várias inovações na tragédia: ênfase na análise psicológica, preocupações científica e filosóficas, coros independentes da ação, introdução de personagens do povo” (KOOGAN/HOUAISS. Enciclopédia e Dicionário Ilustrado, op. cit., p. 642). *6: Vide nota 7 do capítulo II, Herôdotos. *7: “Más-línguas afirmam que Sófocles consumou sua velhice com a hetera Têoris, tendo um filho. Seu filho legítimo Iófas, talvez temendo que o poeta legasse ao filho de Têoris, levantou contra ele uma ação judicial,acusando-o de servil e incapaz da administração dos bens, Sófocles, para provar sua lucidez, fez perante os juízes a leitura de certos trechos da peça que na ocasião estava escrevendo, e que se julgou ser Édipo em Colono, ao término da leitura, os juízes não só o absolveram como o acompanharam até sua casa” (DURANT, Will. História da Civilização Mundial: nossa herança clássica, op. cit., vol. II, p. 314). *8: SÓFOCLES. Antígona. Brasília: Universidade de Brasília, 1997, p. 45. *9: Idem, op. cit., pp. 41-2. *10: “Aquela (Antígona), porém, prefere ficar com as ordens mais altas dos deuses, inacessíveis à maldade humana” (MACHADO PAUPÉRIO, A. O Direito Político de Resistência. 2ª ed. Rio de Janeiro: Forense, 1978, p. 38). *11: “Antígona, entretanto, rebelou-se contra o edital de Creonte, considerando o sepultamento um dever mais forte que as leis dos homens, principalmente em se tratando de parentes, e cumpriu, embora sumariamente, os ritos fúnebres de Polinice” (KURY, Mário da Gama. Dicionário de Mitologia Grega e Romana. Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Sales, 1990, p. 35). *12: “No século V a.C., os grandes trágicos gregos, Ésquilo, Sófocles e Eurípedes, empregavam os mitos antigos para explorar os mais profundos temas da condição humana” (TARNAS, Richard. A Epopeia do Pensamento Ocidental: para compreender as ideias que molduram nossa visão de mundo. 2ª ed. Rio de Janeiro: Bertrand Brasil, 2000, p. 33). -/- . (shrink)

The article discusses the image of the disruptive entrance of a philosophical stranger into a house related to theatre, as introduced in Plato's Symposium, Bertolt Brecht's dialogues of Der Messingkauf, and Walter Benjamin's essays on Brecht's theater. In each of these cases, the interruption caused by the entrance sets the stage for a performance of philosophy within the arena of theatre. The fact that all three cases are scenes introduced in philosophical texts that address the art of theatre shows how (...) philosophy appropriates the discursive practices of theatre to shed light on the gap between the two disciplines. (shrink)

Lewisian Genuine Realism about possible worlds is often deemed unable to accommodate impossible worlds and reap the benefits that these bestow to rival theories. This thesis explores two alternative extensions of GR into the terrain of impossible worlds. It is divided in six chapters. Chapter I outlines Lewis’ theory, the motivations for impossible worlds, and the central problem that such worlds present for GR: How can GR even understand the notion of an impossible world, given Lewis’ reductive theoretical framework? Since (...) the desideratum is to incorporate impossible worlds into GR without compromising Lewis’ reductive analysis of modality, Chapter II defends that analysis against objections. The rest of the thesis is devoted to incorporating impossible worlds into GR. Chapter III explores GR-friendly impossible worlds in the form of set-theoretic constructions out of genuine possibilia. Then, Chapters IV-VI venture into concrete impossible worlds. Chapter IV addresses Lewis’ objection against such worlds, to the effect that contradictions true at impossible worlds amount to true contradictions tout court. I argue that even if so, the relevant contradictions are only ever about the non-actual, and that Lewis’ argument relies on a premise that cannot be nonquestion- beggingly upheld in the face of genuine impossible worlds in any case. Chapter V proposes that Lewis’ reductive analysis can be preserved, even in the face of genuine impossibilia, if we differentiate the impossible from the possible by means of accessibility relations, understood non-modally in terms of similarity. Finally, Chapter VI counters objections to the effect that there are certain impossibilities, formulated in Lewis’ theoretical language, which genuine impossibilia should, but cannot, represent. I conclude that Genuine Realism is still very much in the running when the discussion turns to impossible worlds. (shrink)

Peter van Inwagen's Direct Argument (DA) for incompatibilism purports to establish incompatibilism with respect to moral responsibility and determinism without appealing to assumptions that compatibilists usually consider controversial. Recently, Michael McKenna has presented a novel critique of DA. McKenna's critique raises important issues about philosophical dialectics. In this article, we address those issues and contend that his argument does not succeed.

Archimedes of Syracuse has long provided a touchstone for considering how we make and acquire knowledge. Since the early Roman chroniclers of Archimedes’ life, and especially intensively since Descartes, scholars have described, sought, or derided the Archimedean point, defining and redefining its epistemic role. “Knowledge,” at least within modernity, is rhetorically tied to the figure of the Archimedean point, a place somewhere outside a regular and constrained world of experience. If this figure still leads to useful ways of thinking about (...) knowing, we are left with the question of how different modes of making knowledge approach their “Archimedean” points. The question is especially important today as a renewed .. (shrink)

We present a general framework for representing belief-revision rules and use it to characterize Bayes's rule as a classical example and Jeffrey's rule as a non-classical one. In Jeffrey's rule, the input to a belief revision is not simply the information that some event has occurred, as in Bayes's rule, but a new assignment of probabilities to some events. Despite their differences, Bayes's and Jeffrey's rules can be characterized in terms of the same axioms: "responsiveness", which requires that revised beliefs (...) incorporate what has been learnt, and "conservativeness", which requires that beliefs on which the learnt input is "silent" do not change. To illustrate the use of non-Bayesian belief revision in economic theory, we sketch a simple decision-theoretic application. (shrink)

This article explores the controversy between ancient Greek dramatists and their fellow philosophers over the vertical axis, with special reference to Socrates. I begin with a discussion of the vertical axis in Greek theatre, and turn to Sophocles’ Oedipus Tyrannus to discuss the vertical as a manifestation of the tragic preference ascribed to our “divine” upper body over our “bestial” lower body. Then, I discuss the deus ex machina as an image of divine vertical intervention in the horizontal human plot, (...) and claim that Plato’s and Aristotle’s philosophical critique of this theatrical convention fails to notice that the dramatists made a subversive use of the illogicality of this convention. The second part of the article is dedicated to the vertical as an expression of man’s desire to transcend the boundaries of the human sphere. I discuss the negative treatment of this desire by Greek dramatists, who regard it as an unworthy aspiration, compared to its positive treatment by Greek philosophers, who presents it as a worthy aspiration, since it is only through such an ascent that one can get a glimpse of the eternal. In this context, I examine two representations of Socrates: his deus ex machina appearance in Aristophanes’ Clouds, implying the hubristic stance of philosophers; and his habit of long immobile standings as introduced in Plato’s Symposium, implying the philosophers’ superiority over the dramatists. However, the publicly-visible nature of Socrates’ standstills also turns them into a display of philosophizing, meaning that Socrates of the Symposium is a philosopher who (perhaps unfairly) theatricalizes his verticality so as to challenge the art of theatre. (shrink)

This report by the WHO Consultative Group on Equity and Universal Health Coverage addresses how countries can make fair progress towards the goal of universal coverage. It explains the relevant tradeoffs between different desirable ends and offers guidance on how to make these tradeoffs.

Religion, especially Western religion, calls upon us to 'believe' on the basis of 'faith.' But in what way can faith serve as a justification for belief? In this essay, I distinguish between 'belief in' and 'belief that' and argue that faith, properly understood, entails the former, not the latter.

This paper explores the implications of extended and distributed cognition theory for our notions of personal identity. On an extended and distributed approach to cognition, external information is under certain conditions constitutive of memory. On a narrative approach to personal identity, autobiographical memory is constitutive of our diachronic self. In this paper, I bring these two approaches together and argue that external information can be constitutive of one’s autobiographical memory and thus also of one’s diachronic self. To develop this claim, (...) I draw on recent empirical work in human-computer interaction, looking at lifelogging technologies in both healthcare and everyday contexts. I argue that personal identity can neither be reduced to psychological structures instantiated by the brain nor by biological structures instantiated by the organism, but should be seen as an environmentally-distributed and relational construct. In other words, the complex web of cognitive relations we develop and maintain with other people and technological artifacts partly determines our self. This view has conceptual, methodological, and normative implications: we should broaden our concepts of the self as to include social and artifactual structures, focus on external memory systems in the (empirical) study of personal identity, and not interfere with people’s distributed minds and selves. (shrink)

This paper has two distinct but related goals: (1) to identify some of the potential consequences of the Internet for our cognitive abilities and (2) to suggest an approach to evaluate these consequences. I begin by outlining the Google effect, which (allegedly) shows that when we know information is available online, we put less effort into storing that information in the brain. Some argue that this strategy is adaptive because it frees up internal resources which can then be used for (...) other cognitive tasks, whereas others argue that this is maladaptive because it makes us less knowledgeable. I argue that the currently available empirical evidence in cognitive psychology does not support strong conclusions about the negative effects of the Internet on memory. Before we can make value-judgements about the cognitive effects of the Internet, we need more robust and ecologically-valid evidence. Having sketched a more nuanced picture of the Google effect, I then argue that the value of our cognitive abilities is in part intrinsic and in part instrumental, that is, they are both valuable in themselves and determined by the socio-cultural context in which these cognitive abilities are utilised. Focussing on instrumental value, I argue that, in an information society such as ours, having the skills to efficiently navigate, evaluate, compare, and synthesize online information are (under most circumstances) more valuable than having a lot of facts stored in biological memory. This is so, partly because using the Internet as an external memory system has overall benefits for education, navigation, journalism, and academic scholarship. (shrink)

In Mind and World, John McDowell argues against the view that perceptual representation is non-conceptual. The central worry is that this view cannot offer any reasonable account of how perception bears rationally upon belief. I argue that this worry, though sensible, can be met, if we are clear that perceptual representation is, though non-conceptual, still in some sense 'assertoric': Perception, like belief, represents things as being thus and so.

We present an ontology of pain and of other pain-related phenomena, building on the definition of pain provided by the International Association for the Study of Pain (IASP). Our strategy is to identify an evolutionarily basic canonical pain phenomenon, involving unpleasant sensory and emotional experience based causally in localized tissue damage that is concordant with that experience. We then show how different variant cases of this canonical pain phenomenon can be distinguished, including pain that is elevated relative to peripheral trauma, (...) pain that is caused neuropathically (thus with no necessary peripheral stimulus), and pain reports arising through deception either of self or of others. We describe how our approach can answer some of the objections raised against the IASP definition, and sketch how it can be used to support more sophisticated discrimination of different types of pain resulting in improved data analysis that can help in advancing pain research. (shrink)

What we value, like, endorse, want, and prefer changes over the course of our lives. Richard Pettigrew presents a theory of rational decision making for agents who recognise that their values will change over time and whose decisions will affect those future times.

During much of the past century, it was widely believed that phonemes--the human speech sounds that constitute words--have no inherent semantic meaning, and that the relationship between a combination of phonemes (a word) and its referent is simply arbitrary. Although recent work has challenged this picture by revealing psychological associations between certain phonemes and particular semantic contents, the precise mechanisms underlying these associations have not been fully elucidated. Here we provide novel evidence that certain phonemes have an inherent, non-arbitrary emotional (...) quality. Moreover, we show that the perceived emotional valence of certain phoneme combinations depends on a specific acoustic feature--namely, the dynamic shift within the phonemes' first two frequency components. These data suggest a phoneme-relevant acoustic property influencing the communication of emotion in humans, and provide further evidence against previously held assumptions regarding the structure of human language. This finding has potential applications for a variety of social, educational, clinical, and marketing contexts. (shrink)

On standard readings of Grice, Gricean communication requires (a) possession of a concept of belief, (b) the ability to make complex inferences about others’ goal-directed behaviour, and (c) the ability to entertain fourth order meta-representations. To the extent that these abilities are pre-requisites of Gricean communication they are inconsistent with the view that Gricean communication could play a role in their development. In this paper, I argue that a class of ‘minimally Gricean acts’ satisfy the intentional structure described by Grice, (...) but require none of abilities (a)-(c). As a result, Gricean communicative abilities may indeed contribute to the development of (a)-(c) – in particular, by enabling language development. This conclusion has important implications for our theorising about cognitive development. (shrink)

There are various philosophical approaches and theories describing the intimate relation people have to artifacts. In this paper, I explore the relation between two such theories, namely distributed cognition and distributed morality theory. I point out a number of similarities and differences in these views regarding the ontological status they attribute to artifacts and the larger systems they are part of. Having evaluated and compared these views, I continue by focussing on the way cognitive artifacts are used in moral practice. (...) I specifically conceptualise how such artifacts (a) scaffold and extend moral reasoning and decision-making processes, (b) have a certain moral status which is contingent on their cognitive status, and (c) whether responsibility can be attributed to distributed systems. This paper is primarily written for those interested in the intersection of cognitive and moral theory as it relates to artifacts, but also for those independently interested in philosophical debates in extended and distributed cognition and ethics of (cognitive) technology. (shrink)

Research in this study was conducted in Singkawang city, West Kalimantan Province, Indonesia which embraces a harmonious multicultural society with three major ethnicities, namely TIDAYU (Chinese, Dayak and Malay). The rich cultural diversities give positive advantages for tourism development and bode well for significant local economic growth. Among others, the Cap Go Meh (Chinese religious tradition) is considered to the biggest event in the region that involves the TIDAYU. Even though the Cap Go Meh is annually celebrated in many different (...) parts of the world, the Singkawang Cap Go Meh Festival has unique features that attract Chinese diasporas from other regions in Indonesia and neighboring countries. For that reason, the actors involved in this event constitute various social, economic, and political backgrounds. This research focused on how Singkawang local government can develop a distinctive tourism strategy to address the specific multi stakeholder interactions using a qualitative approach. The research found that in the context of tourism policy development, the interaction and dynamic patterns among policy actors are developed through linear individual cooperation. Within this pattern, the interaction amongst policy actors tend to involve certain individuals who have authority in controlling resources regardless of their origin or organizations. In fact, this pattern is very strongly based on family relationships or friendships found in both public and private domains. The research has shown that the strategies used in developing tourism policy in Singkawang city should be developed based on network management and good stakeholder engagement. (shrink)

Ernst Cassirer has been proclaimed a follower of Hermann Cohen. However, Cassirer modified the basic concepts of Cohen’s theory of knowledge, so that Cassirer’s philosophical positions in many aspects actually stand in opposition to Cohen’s. Although Cassirer did follow Cohen’s methodology coherently, in that path he refuted the main positions of his teacher. Cohen’s philosophical task was forwarding Kant’s critical method to construct a theory of knowledge. He aimed not only to renew Kant’s method in the way he interpreted it, (...) but also to revise, in accordance with Kant’s method, the uncritical positions of Kant's own theory of knowledge. Cohen’s methodology was intended to achieve this goal. In following his teacher’s task, however, Cassirer developed a set of functional concepts which coherently reveal and overturn the uncritical positions in the theory of knowledge, including the one essential for Cohen himself. Consequently, it may be said, Cassirer “revises” Cohen’s system in a same way that Cohen revised Kant. (shrink)

Investigation of neural and cognitive processes underlying individual variation in moral preferences is underway, with notable similarities emerging between moral- and risk-based decision-making. Here we specifically assessed moral distributive justice preferences and non-moral financial gambling preferences in the same individuals, and report an association between these seemingly disparate forms of decision-making. Moreover, we find this association between distributive justice and risky decision-making exists primarily when the latter is assessed with the Iowa Gambling Task. These findings are consistent with neuroimaging studies (...) of brain function during moral and risky decision-making. This research also constitutes the first replication of a novel experimental measure of distributive justice decision-making, for which individual variation in performance was found. Further examination of decision-making processes across different contexts may lead to an improved understanding of the factors affecting moral behaviour. (shrink)

In an earlier paper, "Non-conceptual Content and the 'Space of Reasons'", I distinguished two forms of the view that perceptual content is non-conceptual, which I called the 'state view' and the 'content view'. On the latter, but not the former, perceptual states have a different kind of content than do cognitive states. Many have found it puzzling why anyone would want to make this claim and, indeed, what it might mean. This paper attempts to address these questions.

It is sometimes claimed that Gricean communication is necessarily a form of cooperative or ‘joint’ action. A consequence of this Cooperative Communication View is that Gricean communication could not itself contribute to an explanation of the possibility of joint action. I argue that even though Gricean communication is often a form of joint action, it is not necessarily so—since it does not always require intentional action on the part of a hearer. Rejecting the Cooperative Communication View has attractive consequences for (...) our theorising about human cognitive development, since it opens up the possibility of appealing to communicative interaction to explain the emergence of joint action in phylogeny. (shrink)

The Global Forum on Bioethics in Research (GFBR) served as a global platform for debate on ethical issues in international health research between 1999 and 2008, bringing together research ethics experts, researchers, policy makers and community members from developing and developed countries. In total, nine GFBR meetings were held on six continents. Work is currently underway to revive the GFBR. This paper describes the purpose and history of the GFBR and presents key elements for its reinstatement, future functioning and sustainability. (...) Potential participants and sponsors are encouraged to contribute actively to the future of this unique international research ethics event. (shrink)

Frege held that referring expressions in general, and demonstratives and indexicals in particular, contribute more than just their reference to what is expressed by utterances of sentences containing them. Heck first attempts to get clear about what the essence of the Fregean view is, arguing that it rests upon a certain conception of linguistic communication that is ultimately indefensible. On the other hand, however, he argues that understanding a demonstrative (or indexical) utterance requires one to think of the object denoted (...) in an appropriate way. This fact makes it difficult to reconcile the view that referring expressions are "directly referential" with any view that seeks (as Grice's does) to ground meaning in facts about communication. (shrink)

La cobertura universal de salud está en el centro de la acción actual para fortalecer los sistemas de salud y mejorar el nivel y la distribución de la salud y los servicios de salud. Este documento es el informe fi nal del Grupo Consultivo de la OMS sobre la Equidad y Cobertura Universal de Salud. Aquí se abordan los temas clave de la justicia (fairness) y la equidad que surgen en el camino hacia la cobertura universal de salud. Por lo (...) tanto, el informe es pertinente para cada agente que infl uye en ese camino y en particular para los gobiernos, ya que se encargan de supervisar y guiar el progreso hacia la cobertura universal de salud. (shrink)

According to the Asymmetry, we’ve strong moral reason to prevent miserable lives from coming into existence, but no moral reason to bring happy lives into existence. This procreative asymmetry is often thought to be part of commonsense morality, however theoretically puzzling it might prove to be. I argue that this is a mistake. The Asymmetry is merely prima facie intuitive, and loses its appeal on further reflection. Mature commonsense morality recognizes no fundamental procreative asymmetry. It may recognize some superficially similar (...) theses, but we will see that they derive from more familiar principles, and are compatible with there being moral reason to bring happy lives into existence. (shrink)

Effective altruism sounds so innocuous—who could possibly be opposed to doing good more effectively? Yet it has inspired significant backlash in recent years. This paper addresses some common misconceptions and argues that the core “beneficentric” ideas of effective altruism are both excellent and widely neglected. Reasonable people may disagree on details of implementation, but all should share the basic goals or values underlying effective altruism.

The primary goal of this essay is to provide a comprehensive overview and analysis of the various relations between material artifacts and the embodied mind. A secondary goal of this essay is to identify some of the trends in the design and use of artifacts. First, based on their functional properties, I identify four categories of artifacts co-opted by the embodied mind, namely (1) embodied artifacts, (2) perceptual artifacts, (3) cognitive artifacts, and (4) affective artifacts. These categories can overlap and (...) so some artifacts are members of more than one category. I also identify some of the techniques (or skills) we use when interacting with artifacts. Identifying these categories of artifacts and techniques allows us to map the landscape of relations between embodied minds and the artifactual world. Second, having identified categories of artifacts and techniques, this essay then outlines some of the trends in the design and use of artifacts, focussing on neuroprosthetics, brain-computer interfaces, and personalisation algorithms nudging their users towards particular epistemic paths of information consumption. (shrink)

This article provides an overview and analysis of recent work on the extended self, demonstrating that the boundaries of selves are fluid, shifting across biological, artifactual, and sociocultural structures. First, it distinguishes the notions of minimal self, person, and narrative self. Second, it surveys how philosophers, psychologists, and cognitive scientists argue that embodiment, cognition, emotion, consciousness, and moral character traits can be extended and what that implies for the boundaries of selves. It also reviews and responds to various criticisms and (...) counterarguments against the extended self. The main focus is on the link between the extended mind and extended self, which has received the most attention in recent literature. But accounts of the extended self developed independently of the extended mind are also briefly discussed. This article ends by drawing out some of the conceptual, methodological, and normative implications of the extended self and suggesting some directions for future research. (shrink)

This report from the WHO Consultative Group on Equity and Universal Health Coverage offers advice on how to make progress fairly towards universal health coverage.

This Element, written for researchers and students in philosophy and the behavioral sciences, reviews and critically assesses extant work on number concepts in developmental psychology and cognitive science. It has four main aims. First, it characterizes the core commitments of mainstream number cognition research, including the commitment to representationalism, the hypothesis that there exist certain number-specific cognitive systems, and the key milestones in the development of number cognition. Second, it provides a taxonomy of influential views within mainstream number cognition research, (...) along with the central challenges these views face. Third, it identifies and critically assesses a series of core philosophical assumptions often adopted by number cognition researchers. Finally, the Element articulates and defends a novel version of pluralism about number concepts. (shrink)

This paper analyses the phenomenology and epistemology of chatbots such as ChatGPT and Bard. The computational architecture underpinning these chatbots are large language models (LLMs), which are generative artificial intelligence (AI) systems trained on a massive dataset of text extracted from the Web. We conceptualise these LLMs as multifunctional computational cognitive artifacts, used for various cognitive tasks such as translating, summarizing, answering questions, information-seeking, and much more. Phenomenologically, LLMs can be experienced as a “quasi-other”; when that happens, users anthropomorphise them. (...) For most users, current LLMs are black boxes, i.e., for the most part, they lack data transparency and algorithmic transparency. They can, however, be phenomenologically and informationally transparent, in which case there is an interactional flow. Anthropomorphising and interactional flow can, in some users, create an attitude of (unwarranted) trust towards the output LLMs generate. We conclude this paper by drawing on the epistemology of trust and testimony to examine the epistemic implications of these dimensions. Whilst LLMs generally generate accurate responses, we observe two epistemic pitfalls. Ideally, users should be able to match the level of trust that they place in LLMs to the degree that LLMs are trustworthy. However, both their data and algorithmic opacity and their phenomenological and informational transparency can make it difficult for users to calibrate their trust correctly. The effects of these limitations are twofold: users may adopt unwarranted attitudes of trust towards the outputs of LLMs (which is particularly problematic when LLMs hallucinate), and the trustworthiness of LLMs may be undermined. (shrink)

In this paper, we seek a reliabilist account of justified credence. Reliabilism about justified beliefs comes in two varieties: process reliabilism (Goldman, 1979, 2008) and indicator reliabilism (Alston, 1988, 2005). Existing accounts of reliabilism about justified credence comes in the same two varieties: Jeff Dunn (2015) proposes a version of process reliabilism, while Weng Hong Tang (2016) offers a version of indicator reliabilism. As we will see, both face the same objection. If they are right about what justification is, it (...) is mysterious why we care about justification, for neither of the accounts explains how justification is connected to anything of epistemic value. We will call this the Connection Problem. I begin by describing Dunn’s process reliabilism and Tang’s indicator reliabilism. I argue that, understood correctly, they are, in fact, extensionally equivalent. That is, Dunn and Tang reach the top of the same mountain, albeit by different routes. However, I argue that both face the Connection Problem. In response, I offer my own version of reliabilism, which is both process and indicator, and I argue that it solves that problem. Furthermore, I show that it is also extensionally equivalent to Dunn’s reliabilism and Tang’s. Thus, I reach the top of the same mountain as well. (shrink)

Critics have often misunderstood the higher-order theory (HOT) of consciousness. Here we clarify its position on several issues, and distinguish it from other views such as the global The higher-order theory (HOT) of consciousness has often been misunderstood by critics. Here we clarify its position on several issues, and distinguish it from other views such as the global workspace theory (GWT) and early sensory models (e.g. first-order local recurrency theories). For example, HOT has been criticized for over-intellectualizing consciousness. We show (...) that while higher-order states are cognitively assembled, the requirements are actually considerably less than often presumed. In this sense HOT may be viewed as an intermediate position between GWT and early sensory views. Also, we clarify that most proponents of HOT do not stipulate consciousness as equivalent to metacognition or confidence. Further, compared to other existing theories, HOT can arguably account better for complex everyday experiences, such as of emotions and episodic memories. This makes HOT particularly useful as a framework for conceptualizing pathological mental states. (shrink)

According to certain normative theories in epistemology, rationality requires us to be logically omniscient. Yet this prescription clashes with our ordinary judgments of rationality. How should we resolve this tension? In this paper, I focus particularly on the logical omniscience requirement in Bayesian epistemology. Building on a key insight by Hacking :311–325, 1967), I develop a version of Bayesianism that permits logical ignorance. This includes: an account of the synchronic norms that govern a logically ignorant individual at any given time; (...) an account of how we reduce our logical ignorance by learning logical facts and how we should update our credences in response to such evidence; and an account of when logical ignorance is irrational and when it isn’t. At the end, I explain why the requirement of logical omniscience remains true of ideal agents with no computational, processing, or storage limitations. (shrink)

Conditionalization is one of the central norms of Bayesian epistemology. But there are a number of competing formulations, and a number of arguments that purport to establish it. In this paper, I explore which formulations of the norm are supported by which arguments. In their standard formulations, each of the arguments I consider here depends on the same assumption, which I call Deterministic Updating. I will investigate whether it is possible to amend these arguments so that they no longer depend (...) on it. As I show, whether this is possible depends on the formulation of the norm under consideration. (shrink)

Rescorla (Erkenntnis, 2020) has recently pointed out that the standard arguments for Bayesian Conditionalization assume that whenever I become certain of something, it is true. Most people would reject this assumption. In response, Rescorla offers an improved Dutch Book argument for Bayesian Conditionalization that does not make this assumption. My purpose in this paper is two-fold. First, I want to illuminate Rescorla’s new argument by giving a very general Dutch Book argument that applies to many cases of updating beyond those (...) covered by Conditionalization, and then showing how Rescorla’s version follows as a special case of that. Second, I want to show how to generalise R. A. Briggs and Richard Pettigrew’s Accuracy Dominance argument to avoid the assumption that Rescorla has identified (Briggs and Pettigrew in Noûs, 2018). In both cases, these arguments proceed by first establishing a very general reflection principle. (shrink)

Hartry Field has suggested that we should adopt at least a methodological deflationism: [W]e should assume full-fledged deflationism as a working hypothesis. That way, if full-fledged deflationism should turn out to be inadequate, we will at least have a clearer sense than we now have of just where it is that inflationist assumptions ... are needed. I argue here that we do not need to be methodological deflationists. More pre-cisely, I argue that we have no need for a disquotational truth-predicate; (...) that the word true, in ordinary language, is not a disquotational truth-predicate; and that it is not at all clear that it is even possible to introduce a disquotational truth-predicate into ordinary language. If so, then we have no clear sense how it is even possible to be a methodological deflationist. My goal here is not to convince a committed deflationist to abandon his or her position. My goal, rather, is to argue, contrary to what many seem to think, that reflection on the apparently trivial character of T-sentences should not incline us to deflationism. (shrink)

William Alston has written that religious belief is justifiable because it is based upon epistemic practices similar to those justifying belief in sensory facts. In this paper I argue for a different understanding of religious belief. What is called for in religious belief is not affirmation of factual truth-claims but devotion to God. The significance and validity of creedal formulae lie in their capacity to elicit and express such devotion, not in their factual and/or informational character. My paper considers four (...) fundamental questions with respect to religious belief: 1. What is a religious belief? 2. What is the basis upon which one should adopt a religious belief? 3. What is the relation between belief and salvation/sanctification? 4. What attitude should one adopt toward alternate belief systems? I argue that these questions are best answered when we recognize the radical dissimilarity of creedal formulae to empirical truth-claims. (shrink)

Veritism says that the fundamental source of epistemic value for a doxastic state is the extent to which it represents the world correctly: that is, its fundamental epistemic value is deter...

There is too much that we do not know about COVID-19. The longer we take to find it out, the more lives will be lost. In this paper, we will defend a principle of risk parity: if it is permissible to expose some members of society (e.g. health workers or the economically vulnerable) to a certain level of ex ante risk in order to minimize overall harm from the virus, then it is permissible to expose fully informed volunteers to a (...) comparable level of risk in the context of promising research into the virus. We apply this principle to three examples of risky research: skipping animal trials for promising treatments, human challenge trials to speed up vaccine development, and low-dose controlled infection or “variolation.” We conclude that if volunteers, fully informed about the risks, are willing to help fight the pandemic by aiding promising research, there are strong moral reasons to gratefully accept their help. To refuse it would implicitly subject others to still graver risks. (shrink)

Accuracy arguments for the core tenets of Bayesian epistemology differ mainly in the conditions they place on the legitimate ways of measuring the inaccuracy of our credences. The best existing arguments rely on three conditions: Continuity, Additivity, and Strict Propriety. In this paper, I show how to strengthen the arguments based on these conditions by showing that the central mathematical theorem on which each depends goes through without assuming Additivity.

In this paper, I describe how artifacts and autobiographical memory are integrated into new systemic wholes, allowing us to remember our personal past in a more reliable and detailed manner. After discussing some empirical work on lifelogging technology, I elaborate on the dimension of autobiographical dependency, which is the degree to which we depend on an object to be able to remember a personal experience. When this dependency is strong, we integrate information in the embodied brain and in an object (...) to reconstruct an autobiographical memory. In such cases, autobiographical memory is extended or distributed. (shrink)

Logic has pride of place in mathematics and its 20th century offshoot, computer science. Modern symbolic logic was developed, in part, as a way to provide a formal framework for mathematics: Frege, Peano, Whitehead and Russell, as well as Hilbert developed systems of logic to formalize mathematics. These systems were meant to serve either as themselves foundational, or at least as formal analogs of mathematical reasoning amenable to mathematical study, e.g., in Hilbert’s consistency program. Similar efforts continue, but have been (...) expanded by the development of sophisticated methods to study the properties of such systems using proof and model theory. In parallel with this evolution of logical formalisms as tools for articulating mathematical theories (broadly speaking), much progress has been made in the quest for a mechanization of logical inference and the investigation of its theoretical limits, culminating recently in the development of new foundational frameworks for mathematics with sophisticated computer-assisted proof systems. In addition, logical formalisms developed by logicians in mathematical and philosophical contexts have proved immensely useful in describing theories and systems of interest to computer scientists, and to some degree, vice versa. Three examples of the influence of logic in computer science are automated reasoning, computer verification, and type systems for programming languages. (shrink)

This work is the transcript of a theological dialogue I had with ChatGPT that spanned a couple of days. I began it merely out of curiosity over how ChatGPT might respond to questions and challenges I posed. As it progressed, I became increasingly impressed with the nuance, depth, and relevance of its responses. The dialogue became, for me, something of a contemplative exercise. I still don’t know quite how to understand the ability of generative A.I. to respond with such (apparent) (...) understanding and even insight. -/- I’ve decided to post this dialogue, not only because of the puzzle it poses concerning A.I, but even more, because I believe that the theological conclusions ‘we’ arrived at have real merit. -/- In the end, the theological views expressed here echo those that I’ve expressed in other works of mine, but the expression of these views are enhanced by the way ChatGPT picks up on them, rephrases them, elaborates upon them, and often places them in the context of the classical theological tradition. -/- I might add that I have been an A.I. skeptic for some time now, concerned over the potential dangers of A.I. in general. But this dialogue, anyway, reveals its potential use as a vehicle for reflection, even profound reflection. -/- . (shrink)

Peter van Inwagen's Direct Argument (DA) purports to establish the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility, without appealing to the notion of avoidability, a notion on whose analysis compatibilists and incompatibilists disagree. Van Inwagen intended DA to refute compatibilism, or at least to shift the burden of proof onto the compatibilist. In this paper, we offer a critical assessment of DA. We examine a variety of objections to DA due to John Fischer and Mark Ravizza, Ishtiyaque Haji, Seth Shabo, Michael (...) McKenna, and David Widerker. We divide these objections into those based on dialectical considerations (section 1), and objections in the form of counterexamples to a central principle which the Direct Argument employs (sec 2). The conclusion we reach is that the proponent of DA can deal plausibly with these objections, thus establishing DA as a powerful argument in favor of incompatibilism. (shrink)

I argue that uniquely human forms of ‘Theory of Mind’ are a product of cultural evolution. Specifically, propositional attitude psychology is a linguistically constructed folk model of the human mind, invented by our ancestors for a range of tasks and refined over successive generations of users. The construction of these folk models gave humans new tools for thinking and reasoning about mental states—and so imbued us with abilities not shared by non-linguistic species. I also argue that uniquely human forms of (...) ToM are not required for language development, such that an account of the cultural origins of ToM does not jeopardise the explanation of language development. Finally, I sketch a historical model of the cultural evolution of mental state talk. (shrink)